The U.S. Credit Crisis
The U.S. economy is currently in a crisis, possibly the largest one since the Great Depression. Signs of this situation can be seen everywhere and almost no one in the economy will remain unaffected. The current crisis was primarily caused by the mortgage business which promised big profits in exchange for high risk. However, the system failed to recognize the real risk involved which was subsequently transferred into the financial market where it became the problem of investors who now pay for the faulty risk assessment in the transaction chain.
The American mortgage industry has been around for more than a century and has helped people to fulfill their dream of home-ownership since. But how could such a business with years of experience backed by favorable statistical data go bad? The answer can be summed up into a single word: subprime. Nonetheless, this poses another question: How did subprime come into being?
Fannie and Freddie
Although the mortgage business was already present in the early 1900’s, it did not really take off until Fannie Mae or the Federal National Mortgage Association was called into existence in the 1930s. It bought FHA (Federal Housing Administration) insured loans and sold them in the financial market (“The history of Home Mortgages”). This not only created the secondary mortgage market, but most importantly assured a steady flow of capital towards mortgage companies and finally lenders with homeowner dreams. Furthermore, Fannie Mea introduced central guidelines and rules for issuing loans and was the tool of the federal government to look over the mortgage industry. On the other side, investors were also happy with the government backed securities Fannie Mae sold in the financial market.
The end of the Second World War brought–apart from victory for the allies–a big part of the workforce back to the States. These veterans needed housing and the Veteran Administration decided to help those American war heroes. In 1944, the VA was granted the right to back mortgages made by private lenders to veterans. This step of the federal government massively expanded the mortgage industry and helped to spur the United States’ economic growth. However, the demand for loans was still outweighing the supply, therefore the U.S. Congress chartered in the year 1970 the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation also known as Freddie Mac (“The history of Home Mortgages”). Thus, in the 1970s, a big portion of the flow of capital towards mortgages was controlled by government-sponsored organizations. The federal government had, therefore a strong influence on the mortgage business giving the rules and guidelines. Nonetheless, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, even though created by the government, did not have any guaranties from the government to help them out in tough times, but it was generally assumed that the U.S. government would not let them fall (“Fed Chief Warns of a Risk to Taxpayers”).
The S&L Crisis
Not all mortgage companies were dependent on the capital flow from Fannie and Freddie. There were savings and loans associations, also known as thrifts, who were lending deposited money as mortgages. S&Ls were a major player in the mortgage industry since its origin accounting for 53 percent of the whole business in 1975. Even though S&Ls received preferential treatment by the FED, Various laws passed by the Congress kept them strongly regulated. Deregulation came in the year 1980 in the form of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (“DIDMCA”). Thrifts were given rights that banks enjoyed but lacked the regulation enforced upon banks. Furthermore, the limited savings account rate was eliminated giving banks the possibility to raise rates. Unfortunately, S&Ls were originating mostly long term fixed rate mortgages and thus they could offer only a limited amount of return on their savings accounts even though current rates changed. While there was a big demand for capital, banks raised the interest rates; for S&Ls to keep up they had to raise their rates too which created an asset-liability mismatch. This mismatch together with decreased regulations, lack of experience and supervision in the newly formed industry lead to the savings and loan crises of the 1980’s and 1990’s. The resulted was a dramatic decrease of the number of federally insured S&Ls by about 50 percent and a request for financial assistance of more than 1600 banks to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Consequently, the costs of the savings and loan crisis were estimated at $150 billion for the American taxpayer after government stepped in (Muolo 54).
Surprisingly, there were also entities profiting from this crisis, namely the competition of S&Ls; those were nonbanks funded by Freddie, Fannie or other loans from large banks called warehouse loans. Angelo Mozilo’s Countrywide was a good example. By that time, the two government chartered organizations were allowed to purchase “A” quality loans which gave a significant boost to nonbanks in gaining market share. Nonetheless, there still was no sign of subprime, however its “predecessor” second liens or “second deeds of trust” were well around since the 1960s (Muolo 30).
Second Liens–Subprime Roots
Second liens were small mortgages built on top of the first mortgage. They were considered more risky and therefore had a higher interest rate. With a higher rate there also came higher profit. Benefitial, a company that started the second lien business, made huge profits in the mid 1970s. This made the nondepository second lien companies very attractive for investors –mainly big banks–that opened their warehouse lines of credit to companies like Benefitial or The Money Store. By the end of the 1970s, Benefitial was issuing nonconforming mortgages to less than “A” paper standard borrowers. Although the term subprime was not yet around, these mortgages were basically what we call today subprime mortgages. When the S&L crisis surged in the late 1980s, investors lured by the big profits Benefitial or The Money Store were making turned their attention to nonbanks. Finally, the news of the big profit reached Wall Street where investors were eager to get a piece of the future subprime mortgage pie. This involvement of the Street opened huge warehouse lines of credit to nonbanks. Wall Street firms like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and several others non-prime mortgages into MBS (mortgage-backed securities) turning huge profits (Muolo 35).
The Hunt After “Nonconforming” Mortgages
Meanwhile, mortgage companies found out that it is much more profitable to employ loan brokers instead of having branches. A loan broker is in short a person out on the street trying to sell mortgages and bringing them to the local office. If the loan gets approved, the broker gets percentage points from the deal; the higher the interest rate, the more money the broker gets. This system gives the mortgage broker an incentive to close even very inconvenient deals with his customers. However, this “always closing” attitude was promoted by the mortgage firms because the more high-rate deals they closed the more profit they got.
Moreover, with big profits new competition arose and mortgage companies started looking for new ways to close more deals. Thus, they introduced new mortgage products to the market. Those new products were for instance: adjustable rate mortgages, graduated payment mortgages, or negative amortization mortgages. Some of them, like the negative amortization mortgages, allowed for low initial payments gradually rising throughout the period. Furthermore, the requirements posed on the borrower significantly loosened through time. Mortgage companies required less proof of the borrowers’ solvency to pay the loan back. An example of that are stated income loans in which lenders just write down their salary and it was assumed to be valid.
This pressure was created by the hard competition on the loan brokers to act unethically and close deals that are unfavorable for the lender and also for the company. However, since the broker’s deals were not identified as bad instantly, and the mortgage companies usually approved them while seeing the big profits, there was no direct quality control. Furthermore, since the main goal was quantity, it is obvious that quality was left behind. After 2000, big players like Countrywide and Ameriquest joined the ongoing subprime party with the aim to dominate (Muolo 120). This further boosted the volume of subprime mortgages.
Inflating the Housing Bubble
The easy accessibility of mortgage loans created artificially high demand for housing, which consequently raised the prices and created the housing bubble. In some regions like California for instance, the value of houses was growing by 25 percent annually (Muolo 184). This in turn created equity and thus even if the loan went bad the mortgage company would still end up fairly well off. This was, at least, the very attractive theory.
Most of the mortgage companies went public to raise additional capital to enhance their business. The firms could do it either through a traditional C corporation structure or a real estate investment trust also known as REIT. The main difference was that REIT was based on paying out dividends. In fact 90 percent of the company’s earnings went to the shareholders of a REIT company (Muolo 131). In exchange for this profit giveaway, REITs enjoyed a huge tax break from the federal government. This structure attracts–due to its dividends–a lot of investors, being consequently able to raise a large amount of money by going public. However, the company could not create a pool of capital to serve as a buffer for bad times, and in order to maintain profits it had to expand constantly. REITs were working well when the industry was healthy, but in case of a downturn, they would be the first to go.
Another important thing to impact the mortgage industry was the drastic cut of the federal funds rate. The cuts were mainly a result of 9/11 and the accounting scandals in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The federal funds rate stopped at its historical minimum of 1 percent in 2002. This cut logically influenced the loan funds market including the mortgage industry. Consequently, lower mortgage rates made housing even more available and the industry just boomed. In 2003, when “A” paper rates fell to 5 percent loan originators set a new record of $3.9 trillion of which 10 percent were subprime (Muolo 259). The next year, although the total amount of mortgages fell to $2.8 trillion subprime increased to $608 billion or 21 percent. Finally, in 2006, the second best year, lenders originated $ 3.2 trillion in new loans of which $ 665 billion (21 percent) were subprime. However, another $ 650 billion were stated-income loans, payment option ARMs, and double mortgages (secondary and primary mortgages together), which also belonged to the riskier category (Muolo 185). Therefore, in 2006, roughly 40 percent of the originated mortgages were high risk.
The Hungry Wall Street
The rise in the volume of house loans issued obviously demanded an increase in warehouse lines of credits. The Street however, was hungry for all those mortgages issued and supplied the necessary capital. This huge change in the mortgage industry left Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac behind licking their wounds from their accounting scandals. By issuing MBS and their derivatives in huge amounts the Street begun to dominate most of the capital flow to its liking. Regardless of the enormous profits, for every dollar spent on mortgages, Wall Street firms got an unidentified amount of risk. This lack of comprehending the risk involved was due to the fact that there was really no statistical data about the subprime industry because it has only been around for few years and was still unsettled because its enormous growth. To fully understand the whole processes behind a mortgage loan, one has to examine the complete chain of transferring capital and risk.
The Mortgage Chain
In the front lines there are mortgage brokers looking for customers usually with the help of real estate agents. Once a broker finds a client, he gathers information about the home the mortgage is going to be on and credit information of the borrower. Then he negotiates the mortgage conditions to suit the customer’s demands. The mortgage broker is paid by closed deal, which gives him the incentive to always be closing. As already mentioned, the higher the interest rate is, the higher the commission. Consequently, loan brokers do whatever they can to sell mortgages, which includes overstating home values or unethical selling practices where they talk the customer into getting loans with higher rates. These faulty mortgages were supposed to be sorted out by the mortgage company’s approval department. But because every mortgage, especially of the subprime kind, translated into income almost immediately (for the reason of using gain-on-sale accounting), which in turn meant higher bonuses for the employees, many bad mortgage loans were in fact accepted and passed on to Wall Street.
The big players on the Street send the mortgages to be evaluated by rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s (Muolo 217). However, subprime mortgages pooled into bonds were not exactly the rating agencies’ cup of tea since there was no sufficient statistical data or experience. Furthermore, there was enormous pressure from Wall Street firms on the rating agencies: First, in order to make things easier, firms like Bear Stearns or Merrill Lynch demanded to rate only a fraction of the whole lump of mortgages. Second, if a rating agency gave a bad grade to a bond or CDO (collateralized debt obligation) it risked losing its customer to the competition that was possibly somewhat more easygoing (Muolo 228); for example, if the CDO did not meet the standard Wall Street firms used insurance companies to enhance the rating. Thus, subprime junk mortgages could become part of AA or AAA rated bonds throughout the whole process.
Many investors also from overseas were attracted by the good ratings and returns on many CDOs. Nonetheless, they did not have a clue into what exactly they were investing. Thus, investments were mainly based on trust in the big Wall Street entities like Solomon Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Bear Sterns or Citigroup. In the whole process, from issuing mortgages to selling them in bonds at Wall Street, there was a huge risk transfer. As the home prices continued to rise, and profits kept flowing in, nobody really wanted to see the risk involved.
If the market fails to recognize the risk involved, government entities like the Fed or the SEC (Security Exchange Commission) should step in. According the Federal Reserve System’s Mission it should “maintain the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk that may arise in financial markets” which also includes controlling asset bubbles (“Mission”). However, no major steps were taken. Similarly, the SEC did not assure the transparency in the MBS (mortgage backed securities) market. Moreover, this apathetic attitude of the government entities might have been caused by lobbying of various mortgage companies to further leave the rules loose. Thus the government failed to recognize and fight a looming crisis and has to deal now with the consequences.
Closing the Candy Store
The big boom in the mortgage industry started to come to an end in 2007. Risky loans began to go bad. By October 2007, Countrywide, the biggest lender in the US, had a 24 percent delinquency rate of its subprime servicing portfolio (Muolo 253). Similar reports could be seen throughout the whole industry. The delinquencies did not just stay in the subprime sector. “A” paper late payments have risen by 30 percent in the last year. The number of foreclosures rose taking the home prices down. The most important process the whole mortgage industry relied on–home value appreciation–drastically failed leading many mortgage firms to bankruptcy.
The disaster wave caused by late payments and foreclosures continued towards Wall Street. Two hedge funds managed by Bear Sterns and focusing mainly on CDOs collapsed in the summer of 2007 with millions of investor assets gone. Consequently, Bear reported a $850 million loss for the fourth quarter and had to write down assets of almost $2 billion in its books. Simultaneously, at the end of 2007, other Street firms found themselves writing down billions of dollars of subprime CDOs: Citigroup $11 billion with a potential of $45 billion, United bank of Switzerland $10 billion, Merrill Lynch $8.5 billion, with others following. By spring 2008, the write downs made by investment banking firms, banks, and thrifts totaled $200 billion (Muolo 260).
Back at the other end of the chain, mortgage companies had huge lay-offs, and together with the downturn in the construction industry about 420,000 jobs disappeared. This rise in unemployment again triggered late payments and foreclosures even for “A” paper loans. Home prices were falling by 10 to 20 percent in some metropolitan areas. Signs of an upcoming crisis forced the Fed into action: by March 2008 it has cut short-term overnight rates to 2.25 percent in order to create more liquidity in the funds markets (Muolo 286).
The Crisis Begins to Unfold Itself
The Fed was now worried about the collapse of the U.S. mortgage market which by March 2008 securitized more than $1 trillion in subprime loans during the previous 30 months (Muolo 287). Thus the central bank assisted in the sale of Bear Stearns (which had $30 billion in problem assets mostly coming from CDOs, ABSs, and mortgage derivatives) to JPMorgan Chase. Seeing one of the most prominent names on Wall Street vanish is an undisputable sign of a financial crisis.
By spring 2008, 10,000 loan brokerage firms had closed with another 10,000 in danger of failing by the end of 2008. As companies like Countrywide or Ameriquest were gone almost 40 percent of the mortgage industry disappeared (Muolo 301). The crisis worsened throughout summer of 2008 with the collapse of the largest mortgage lender IndyMac (“IndyMac Bank seized”). The end of the summer brought another series of catastrophic news: on September 8, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were seized by the government to guarantee their future existence (“Government Seizes Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac”). The series of bad news continued in mid-September when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Merrill Lynch was acquisitioned by Bank of America, and AIG asked the Fed for a loan. The Fed then issued a $85 billion rescue package to help AIG (“Financial Giants Falling: Lehman, Merrill Lynch, AIG”). Furthermore, on September 25, Washington Mutual, the largest U.S. savings and loan association, was closed and subsequently sold to JPMorgan Chase. All this unfavorable news had obviously a devastating effect not only on the stock markets in the U.S. but also throughout the whole world. In September, the Dow Jones Industrial Average sunk below the 11,000 mark while it was a year ago breaking records with an overall high at more than 14,000.
The Bailout Plan
The size of the crisis was now enormous and the Fed had to take radical action. On September 28, Congressional leaders and the White house agreed on a $700 billion bailout plan to rescue the plunging economy and stop the financial crisis. Although this solution would help the current situation, it would also increase the 2008 budget deficit which will in turn add to the U.S. government debt, which would be forced to pass the $10 trillion mark. Consequently, the huge tax burden of the bailout was the reason that on Monday the 29th, Congress did not pass the plan and sent the stock markets into a nosedive, resulting in the Dow losing 777 points: the biggest day point loss ever. This translates to over $1 trillion worth of assets erased from the market over the course of six and a half hours. Consequently, investors hold on to their assets, further decreasing the overall liquidity in the economy. Confirming this fear was the Tuesday’s Bank-To-Bank lending rates increase to 4.05 percent (“Bank-To-Bank Lending Rates On The Rise”). However, The Dow recovered the same day almost half its losses because of the rise in confidence about the passing of the bailout bill. Thus, the plan was modified by the Senate to be passed over on Friday, October 3 to the House of Representatives. The new legislation, among the promised $700 billion, encompasses tax cuts or raising the FDIC insurance limit to $250,000 to ensure more votes in the House (“Senate passes $700B rescue; House votes lured”).
Although the U.S. government bailout will be a huge burden on taxpayers, it has become a necessity to get the financial markets moving. This is especially important since many entities in the American economy rely on the lending which is a factor influencing consumer spending–the motor of the U.S. economy. On the other hand, the money will be used to save financial institutions that already proved themselves unworthy by getting themselves into the crisis. Additionally, the people whose houses are being foreclosed on will not see a penny from the deal and will be left to battle their financial problems on their own. The bailout is thus definitely not a solution to the whole crises, but just a small step to make things right again. Furthermore the depth of the crisis is yet to be discovered because of unknown amounts of MBS derivatives and the number of mortgages that will go bad.
The Japanese Way
About four years ago, Japan was experiencing a credit crisis similar to the current situation in the U.S. The four islands east of China experienced a property market boom which lead to a lot of mortgage loans. As the housing bubble imploded, decreasing the real estate prices and driving developers bankrupt, many investors found their money lost. Consequently, a lot of major Japanese banks went on the edge of bankruptcy and it was assumed that the crisis could become a global threat. Fortunately, the Japanese government stepped in and bailed out the financial institutions with $100 billion (“Japan offers solution to financial crisis”). As of 2006, most of the banks were back in the green numbers and even the Bank of Japan made a profit on the whole deal. Thus, the Japanese bailout was a success.
The Japanese case, although somewhat similar to the U.S. crisis, cannot be applied to the American economy. First, the magnitude of the crisis is far bigger in America, and second, the Japanese economy is better off in terms of the trade balance with one of the biggest exports in the world. Thus it had another source of capital which is missing in the American economy. Another difference is that the 2008 credit crisis is already global for the reason that investors from around the world trusted Wall Street with their assets. The global nature of the crisis suggests a global solution. Unfortunately, there are currently too many barriers (like the lack of an authoritative international institution) to make the global cooperation work. Therefore, the bailout is not really a good solution; nonetheless, at this point of time, it is the only rational thing to do.
Other Approaches
It is imperative to understand the fundamental reason behind the crisis in order to overcome it. Greed for money caused people disregard the risks taken. Thus, investors from all around the world bet their assets on the U.S. housing market. As the housing prices went up, their assets were safe, but with the burst of the housing bubble, the investment disappeared in thin air. Therefore, the key to a successful solution of the crisis is to get the housing prices up again. This is easily done by increasing demand for housing.
As mentioned earlier, the global nature of the credit crisis is a fact that has to be taken seriously. It is logical that the U.S. needs to solve the crisis on a global level. Thus, in order to increase demand for housing, the U.S. should promote immigration not only of people but also companies that could profit from the American economy. Although, this would probably mean harder times for the average American, it would bring investment back into the U.S. economy, simultaneously spurring production. Furthermore, this policy would not continue to increase the financial burden of taxpayers and could–on the other hand–possibly even increase the total taxes by increasing production.
Future Changes
It is obvious that this crisis pinpointed some fundamental shortcomings in the current legislation. In the future, it will be necessary to change the rules of the financial market in order to avoid the repetition of a similar situation. Strict rules need to be applied to the loanable funds industry and the controlling mechanisms must be improved. Thanks to modern technologies, implementation of controlling methods should not be a big issue. Furthermore, the principles of transparency and accountability will have to be strictly enforced. This means that investors should know exactly where their assets are going and that managers will be held responsible for the companies’ failures (in contrast to collecting multi-million bonuses while their company goes up in flames). The current crisis is acting as yet another lesson about how the economy functions and gives people the opportunity to fix the system so that it will be safer and more efficient for future generations.
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